Acknowledgements for “The Philosophy of Psychology”
We are delighted to extend our heartfelt gratitude to the numerous individuals and institutions that have contributed to the creation and refinement of our book, “The Philosophy of Psychology.” This work has been significantly enriched by the feedback, support, and patience of many people along the way.
Firstly, we are deeply grateful to our students at the University of Sheffield, both undergraduate and graduate, who engaged with the text at various stages of its development. Their insightful worries and objections have substantially contributed to the book’s improvement. Additionally, we extend our thanks to Colin Allen, who utilized the penultimate draft of the book as a seminar text at Texas A&M University, providing us with invaluable feedback. We are also indebted to Thad Botham, a student in that course, for his individual comments.
Our sincere appreciation goes to the following individuals for their oral and written feedback on parts or all of the material: Colin Allen, Alex Barber, Keith Frankish, Susan Granger, Christopher Hookway, Gabriel Segal, Michael Tye, and a reviewer from Cambridge University Press. Their critiques and suggestions have been instrumental in shaping the final manuscript.
We also express our thanks to Shaun Nichols and his colleagues, as well as Cambridge University Press, for allowing us to reproduce their 1996 diagram of ‘off-line processing,’ which is featured as figure 4.1 in our book. Additionally, we thank Alex Botterill for creating the artwork for figure 3.1.
Finally, we owe a great deal to our families for their unwavering patience and support throughout the writing process.
Audience and Content
When we initially conceived this project, we aimed to create a book that would serve upper-level undergraduate students of philosophy and beginning-level graduate students in cognitive sciences. We envisioned a text that could also engage professionals and contribute to ongoing debates in the field. Whether we have succeeded in this latter aim remains for others to judge.
Deciding on the content was a more challenging task, given the vast range of topics within the philosophy of psychology and the many approaches that could be taken. We chose to focus on the relationship between scientific (cognitive) psychology and common-sense or ‘folk’ psychology, particularly examining how scientific psychology can sometimes challenge our self-image.
Following an introductory chapter on background developments in philosophy of mind and scientific psychology, the main body of the book explores topics such as the interpretation of folk psychology, psychological arguments for nativism and modularity, the nature of folk psychology, human rationality, and the appropriate notion of intentional content required by psychology.
We hope this book will be a valuable resource for students, educators, and professionals alike, providing deep insights into the fascinating field of the philosophy of psychology.